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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CACIIE COUNTY DRAINAGE
""'
.
I
Dl ,S 'l'l'IC'l'
"
no. v- a quasi. corporation
of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

\\'. H. \VESTOYER an<l .ftIYRTHA
No.
\\' ESTOYER, his wife; ALLEN l;-. I Case
12151
\\'IIEELER and DELORES G.
\\'HEELER, his wife; SOICHI l\Y0:,10TO an<l .J .ANE DOE l\VO)IOTO,
his "·ife; J\HCHI I'VOlVIOTO and
.JA.NE DOE
his wife; and
IJUEL
and.JANE DOE
;
his wife,
Defendants and A.7Jpellants.

!

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
OF NATURE OF CASE
Respondent adopts appellants' statement under
this heading.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Respondent adopts the statement made by appellants under this heading.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial
court on its second count, sustained.

STATE1\11ENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a quasi municipal corporation hav·
ing been formed by a proclamation of the Cache County
Commissioners in 1922 (T20L-26).
The Drainage District created by said proclamation
included the N.E. 114 of Section 12. T. 14. N.R.I.,V.S.
now owned by the appellants but for some unknown reason, that cannot now be discovered, there
has never been an assessment for drainage purposes
levied against said northeast quarter.
The balance of the land of the Drainage District
lies to the north and east of said N.E. 1,4. County Roads
run north and south and east and west at the northeast
corner of the northeast quarter. Also a large barrow
pit on the north side of the northeast quarter and south
side of the County Road was in existence in 1922, the
year the district was organized, and the Drainage Dis·
trict used this barrow pit for one of its drains and it
2

carrieJ the drainage water westward some mile or two
lo the Bear River.
This Garrow pit did not function too efficiently
(Ti33) and in wet years water would stand on the
ground until June (T.28).

ln 194<5, Owen Hawlins, who owned property west
of the northeast quarter of Section 12, started a draiu
from the brow of Bear River eastward through his
property ( T .87-90). Others to the east desired to hook
OIL They held a meeting, called themselves the Third
\Yard Drainage Company and extended the drain eastward and then northward through or near the middle
of the northeast quarter of Section 12 towards the barrow pit drain of the respondent herein. (See plaintiff·s
exhibits 15 and 16 - red line representing drain). A
Bergeson, who seemed to take charge of the Third
\\'ar<l Drainage Company, collected certain monies from
the people in this association (T91-L22) and then proceeded to try to collect from others. One was Harold
ood (Tr. 9 l-L25, whose property was immediately
to the west of the northeast quarter of Section 12, who
desired to draw the water from the barrow pit in front
cf his property. l\1r. Bergeson also contacted Loraine
Karren, who was the president of respondent drainage
district in 1945 ( T. 36-L37) and asked a payment of
$JOO.OO at the time when the Third 'Vard Drainage
District tapped the barrow pit in the County Road,
which was refused. He admitted to Mr. Karren (T. 37L19 l that the State had paid them $500.00 to tap the
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barrow pit also. l\Ir. Halgren, a witnes for the respondent, on cross examination, ( T. 66 line 13) said that
Bergeson told him in 1969 that the State paid said
amount to take the water from the highway through this
drain to the river. Russell H. Peterson, a witness for
the respondent who lives on the north side of the County
Road on the lands to the north of the northeast quarter
of Section 12, testified Mr. Bergeson in 1946 (T.155
line 17) had asked him to contact two of his neighbors
for donations for the construction of the drain, but they
each and all ref used.
The witnesses for the appellant admitted that right
from the beginning of the use of the drain it has been
(T. 138-line 15) : "Just washing, making it wider."
Iriel I womoto, a defendant, questioned on
examination (T. 139-line 1):
"Q. And these people then run it against your
will during all of that timeJ making your ditches
wider, and you never stopped them 1

A. Well, as long as use is use, it wasn't hurting
us.

Q. I thought you said it was making your ditch
wider and you didn't like that.
A. Yeah, but we didn't stop them.
Q. That's what I say. You didn't stop them."

A. That's right."
Mr. Bergeson, the president of the Third \V ard
Drainage group, who was one of the chief witnesses
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for the appellant and who collected the money aud paid
the hills, talked about erosion (T. lll-line 21 to T. ll:? line 5) :
·'(..J_. llad it eroded considerably when you put
the pipe in?

. .1. Not a tremendous amount. It had started
and of course when it once starts it can go fast'.

Q. \V ell, then it would start from the time vou
you started the flow of water on it, would it, if
it was erosion, each bit would have its effecU
A. I suppose so, naturally.

Q. So that from the very beginning of the drain

down here there was a wearing away or erosion
right from the very beginning?
A. That's a natural condition.

Q. Sure. So that the water that come off from
this highway and from this drainage district up
above right from day one began to have its effect
upon the use of that ditch?
A. Right."

"r

In 1969 during a wet spring the group known as
ard Drainage Company stopped the water
the Third
at their intake on the County Road and inside of the
\Vestover property. l\!Iachines were used to fill the
drain ditch with dirt ( T 45) which stopped all drainage
from the barrow pit and water stood upon the surface
of the ground (see picture exhibits 3 to 9) water logging
the land and flooding basements. The water had been
running continuously through this drain from the
harrow pit from 1945 to the spring of 1969.
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The barrow pit along the road had not been maintained as a drainage ditch since 1945. There was also
testimony that the State of Utah in 1961 had made
some grade changes (T.68) which caused water from
the west of the entrance to the Third 'V ard Drainage
Company ditch and barrow pit to flow from the west
cowards it. This water from the west did not come fr0111
respondent's drainage.
The water that stood on the ground in the spring
of 1969 after it had flooded to a sufficient depth to go
lo the west was in places two to three feet deep ( T.72)
but prior to the stopping of the drain by the Third
'V ard Drainage Company was flowing freely through
it (T.72).
POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S USE OF APPELLANTS
DRAINAGE DITCH WAS NOT PElllHISSIYE.
CAUSED DAMAGE TO APPELLANTS
THE YERY BEGINNING OF USE. SAID GSE
WAS ADVERSE AND RESPONDENT THEREFORE ACQUIRED A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT
TO THE USE THEREOF.
POINT II
THE TRI:ER OF THE FACTS WAS THE
COURT. IF THERE IS TESTIMONY IN THE
6

HECUHD TO SUPPORT THE COURTS DE-

ClSIOX, IT SHOULD NOT BE DISTUHBED
ON APPEAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S USE OF APPELLANTS.
DRAIXAGE DITCII 'VAS NOT PER.MISSIYE,
CACSED DA.HAGE TO APPELLANTS FHO:\I
THE \'EUY BEGINNING OF USE. SAID CSE
"'AS .AD\rEHSE AND RESPONDENT THEREFOHE .ACQUIRED A PRESCRIPTIYE RIGHT
TO THE USE THEREOF.
The court found, in its Memorandum Decision ( R.
28-29) :

"This court is in agreement with the defendants' contention as to what the law is. However,
further the defendants contend that the evidence
is uncontroverted that the way in question was
open by defendants for their own use and at
their expense and that the use of the way by the
plaintiff neither interferred with nor caused
damage to the defendant. This court holds that
there was damage and testimony from the defendant and the other witnesses of the defendants who are property owners who share in the
use of the drainage ditch and who initiated its
construction was that there was damage by
of erosion over the past years, especially on the
bottom end of the ditch where it goes over a
rather steep incline into the Bear River. Further
7

that it was necessary for repair of the ditch, an<l
further evidence that the reason the ditch was
shut off to the plaintiff was that the plaintiff
was asked to contribute expense to maintain an<l
repair the ditch because of the erosion caused
by the drainage. That is what apparently initiated this whole action."
In the Findings of :Fact of the court entered on the
20th day of .May, 1970, the court found ( R. 54) :
"4. That the use of said drain by the plaintiff
after the construction of said drain has continuously, from the beginning of said use, caused
damage by way of erosion over and abm·e the
erosion created by the owners thereof or their
predecessors in interest and others for their own
use. That said use by the plaintiff was not permissive and said use by plaintiff did interfere
with and cause damage to the defendants right
of way, during all of said time."
The chief witness of the appellant who was not a
party to the law suit but who nevertheless sat at the coun·
cil table of the appellants ( T. 105) during all of the proceedings, l\Ir. Douglas A. Bergeson, said on cross-exami·
nation (T. 111-line 13):
"Q. Now you said you put some pipe on this
grass down here on this outlet on the river. \Vhen
did you put that pipe in?

A. Nineteen fifty-nine. Spring of 1959.
Q. Arid did this run all the time then until
1959 before you had to put pipe in?

A. It had, that's right.
8

(.J_. Had it eroded considerably when \-ou pul
the pipe in?
·
·

A. X ot a tremendous amount. It ha<l started.
and of course when it once starts it can go fast.

Q. 'V ell .then it would start from the time vou
started the flow of water on it, would it, if it
was erosion, each bit would have its effecU
A. I suppose so, naturally.
Q. So that from the very beginning of the drain
down here there was a wearing away or erosion
right from the very beginning.

A. That's a natural condition."

A jlr. Iriel I womoto, one of the defendants and
appellants on cross-examination (T. 138-line 11) said:

''Q. Has this drain, as it comes through your

property, done you any harm?

A. It hasn't done any good.

Q. lV ell, has it done you any harm?
. .1. Just washing, making it wider.
(.J_. Has it been making it wider ever since it was
first used from '45?

A. I'd imagine.

Q. So that right from the very beginning that
these people started to use it, there began to be

a wear and detriment to you people from the

Yery beginning of the time they started to use it?

,\. 'Vell, that I wouldn't know.

'V

Q.
ell, you say it was making it wider all the
time.
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A. It does. This big flush run-off.

Q. And you didn't like that?
A. WellQ. Did you ever go up and stop it during any
of that twenty-four years except in 1969?

A. No.
Q. And these people then run it against your
will during all of that time, making your ditches
wider, and you never stopped them?

A. Well, as long as use is use, it wasn ·t hurting
us.
Q. I thought you said it was making your ditch
wider and you didn't like that.
A. Yeah, but we didn't stop them.
Q. That's what I say. You didn't stop them.
A. That's right."
There is nothing whatsoever in the record showing
where consent was ever given to the respondent to run
its water through the drain but on the contrary right
from the beginning a demand was made on the officers
of the respondent corporation for a payment for the
privilege ( T. 86-87) .
The court made a determination after hearing the
matter that there was damage caused to the appellants
from the use made by the respondent right from the very
beginning of its use and the record amply supports him.
The record is silent as to any consent having been given
by appellants to respondent. The appellant on the other
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hand builds his case on appeal on his conclusions shown
at the bottom of Page 9 and the top of Page 10 of his
brief wherein he concludes:
"The evidence is uncontroverted that the wav
in question was opened by appellants and their
predecessors in interest for their own use at their
own expense, and that the use of the way by the
respondent neither interferred with nor caused
darnage to the appellants".
He says no damage in the face of the judges memorandum of decision the last part of which says:
" ... and further evidence that the reason the
ditch was shut off to the plaintiff was that the
plaintiff was asked to contribute expense to
maintain and repair the ditch because of the erosion caused by the drainage. This is what apparinitiated this whole thing."
Appellant even goes further in his brief on Page 10
and says:
'"Respondent's use of the drain caused no damage thereto. (T.139 Ins. 1-4)"
This reference he makes is just a part of the full
reference that the respondent has printed fully above
starting with T. 138 Line 11. I cannot see how apellant
can reach such a conclusion. The court didn't.
Consequently the appellant having built his entire
case on a false premise to-wit: That the respondents use
of the drain "caused no damage" and having furnished
cases which he says are exceptions to the rule, which
cases arP also predicated upon the theory that the use
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"caused no damage" must fail. He cannot get out of the
general application of the law without first having a de.
termination that the use made by this respondent
"caused no damage." The court found just the opposite.
that the appellants were damaged right from the n'r)·
beginning of respondents use.
The requirements to create a prescriptive easem\.'nt
are set out by many authorities. In the authoritatire
treatise by Thompson on Real Property the following
was stated: Vol. 2, 1961 Replacement, Section :335:
"To establish an easement by prescription there
must be an open, visible, continued and uninterrupetd use or enjoyment thereof under claim
of right, adverse to and with the knowledge of
the owner of the property. Howe,·er, the owner
of the servient land is charged with knowledge
of user and acquiescence in it where the use is
open, adverse, notorious, peasable and uninter·
rupted. A prescriptiYe easement does not rest
upon consent, but upon use alone and in some
states without the aid of any statute. (P.151\
. . . To establish a right by prescription, it is
necessary to prove three things : ( l ) The continued and uninterrupted use or enjoyment of
the right for a full period of twenty years or
whatever period of time is stated by statute:
( 2) The identity of the thing enjoyed; ( 3) That
the use or enjoyment was adverse, or under claim
of right (P.154) ... The ordinary rule is that.
where there has been an unmolested, open and
use of a way for twenty years or morr
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
owner of the servient estate, the use will be pre·
sumed to have been a(frcrsc and under a claim of
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right, and sufficient to create a title by prescription, unless contradicted or explained. ( P .155) .'
(under lining added)
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
ihe same law for our State. In Richins vs. Struhs 17
l'.tah
356, 412 P2d 314 (1966), the court stated the
requirements for obtaining a prescriptive easement:
" ... that the use meets the requirements of being open, notorious, continuous and adverse for
more than twenty years and therefore has established a prescriptive right to continue to so use
it."
It appears that the Utah requirements are the same
as those listed in Thompson. The case of Richins vs.
Strnhs im·olved adjoining land owners who shared a
common roadway and bridge over a creek to their summer homes. Their predecessors in interest were brothersin-law and had jointly constructed the bridge and road" ay, and the roadway, and the road and bridge had been
so used for over 40 years. In 1960 the defendants purchased one of the lots and erected a fence blocking the
others use of the driveway. The District Court ruled for
the defendant, finding that the original use was permissive and created no prescriptive easement. However, the
Supreme Court reversed that decision stating, on page
358 as follows :

"The trial court appears to have been of the
opinion that because the \Vhipples and the
Joneses were relatives, and that they used the
driveway harmoniously and without conflict,
that the use was permissive and that therefore
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no prescriptive right to use the driveway arose.
The difficulty with this view is that it does not
give effect
applicable
to prescriptive rights. fhe ongm and purpose
of their recognition arises out of the general
policy of the law of assuring the peace and good
order of society by leaving a long established
status quo at rest rather than disturbing it. ln
order to serve this purpose, when a claimant has
shown that such a use has existed peaceably and
without interference for the prescriptive period
of 20 years, the law presumes that the use is
adverse to the owner, and that it had a legitimate
origm ...
\Ve think it pertinent to here
that in this, as in most situations of controversy.
there is another side of the coin to be kept in
mind and that we do not lose sight of certain
propositions advocated by the plaintiff in re·
gard to a permissive use where that in fact exists.
The presumption above mentioned that a use
is adverse which arises from its continuance for
a long period of time is not absolute. It would
not preclude the owner of the servient estate
(Defendants herein) from proving that the use
was by permission."
After noting that the presumption that the use was
adverse can be overcome the court concluded that the
defendant did not overcome that presumption, and held
that there was a prescriptive easement for the plaintiff.
The facts of the case are remarkably parallel to
those before the court in this instance. It would be diffi.
cult to design a more analogous situation. The evidence
is unrebutted that plaintiff has used the canal which
14

through defendant's property for over twenty
)·ears; that no payment was ever made by plaintiff for
.'-uch use; that no consent nor permission was e\'er gi,,en
by <lef endant for the use by plaintiff; and that the use
was adverse to the defendants continuously during th2
entire twenty four year period, constantly eroding and
washing the lands and ditch banks of the defendants.
The fact that there has been no open hostility between
lhe parties over the years does not give rise to a presumption of a permissive use. As the court said in Richins vs.
Struhs at page 359:
"j1:ven

though it is sometimes referred to as a
hostile use, it is not necessary that there be any
open hostility manifest in the use of force or any
policy of the law to encourage violence by rewarding it; and it generally does not make the
protection or the acquisition of rights dependent
upon it. The fact that the parties (predecessors)
were friendly, or even cordial with each other,
as they appear to have been, does not prevent
a prescriptiYe right from coming into being."
The cases of Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 514,
17 5 P:2d 17 4, and Lunt vs. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260
P2d 535, are in complete harmony with the above 1966
statement of the Utah Supreme Court. In the 1953 derision of Lunt vs. Kitchens, the court states on page 537:
"The question here involved is whether
is sufficient evidence of adverse user for a period
of twenty years to sustain the trial court's finding of a prescriptive easement."
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The court then favorably explained the history of
the legal fiction of a lost grant theory, then defined tbe ·
difference between "consent" and "acquiescence'' referring to their earlier statement in Zollinger vs. Frank.
"The distinction, we said, lies in whether the
use was "against" the owner or "under" the
owner, regardless of whether the use is described
as peaceable, hostile, adverse to or as acquiesced
in by the servient owner. Because of the presumption that the use of another's land is adverse
to him, the owner has the burden to show that
the use was under his perrnission as
from against it. Cache Valley Banking Company
vs. Cache County Poultry Growers Association
. . . . " (underlining added)
The court then found that on the facts of that par·
ticular case there was no adverse use during the 20 year
period and therefore no prescriptive easment arose. The
court expressly concluded:
"The use by the Kitchenses family added no
burden to the driveway; they did not attempt to
widen it, nor to interfere with the use by the
W eidners."
That rule of law is still entirely valid and upon the
facts of the instant case that law clearly requires a find·
ing of a prescriptive easement for the plaintiff. The use
of the canal by plaintiff over the years did widen the
ditch arid also eroded the land of the defendants. Defend·
ants rely entirely upon their arguments that where a
property owner opens the way for use of his own prern·
ises and another uses it without interf erring with the

16

landowners use or causing damage, the presumption is
that use was permissive. Plaintiff does not dispute that
rroposition of law. But the facts of this case do not allow
such a finding-it is undisputed that defendants dug the
drainage ditch a substantial distance for the benefit of
the State of Utah and not for their own use or purpose
and then requested plaintiff to also pay for using it.
\Vhen asked to pay, Plaintiff and it's individual members all refused to comply and have been using the ditch
adversely from that time forward.
The decision in Zollinger vs. Frank no U514, 175
P2d 714 in 1946 is directly in line with the cases already
cited. There the plaintiff claimed a right of way by
prescription across the north end of the defendants property for the purpose of traveling with equipment and vel1ides. The plaintiff filed the action to restrain defendant from interf erring with its alleged right of way. A
lower court found that the plaintiff did have the claimed
right of way by prescriptive easement and the Supreme
Court affirmed. The first issue to which the court addressed itself was whether or not the use was adverse to
the defendants' interest. The court there determined
that in order to acquire a prescriptive easement the use
must be "against" the owner as distinguished from "under" the owner. In finding that a prescriptive easement
had been created, the court stated the rule more recently
restated in Richins vs. Struhs:
"The prevailing rule is that where a claimant
has shown an open visible, continuous and unmolested use of land for the period of time suf-
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ficient to acquire an easement by adverse user.
the use will be presumed to be under a claim
of right. The owner of the servient estate, 111
order to avoid the acquisition of an easement
by prescription, has the burden of reuuttiny thi1
presumption by showing that the use was per.
mitted .... We think the better rule is described
as the prevailing rule in the above quotation.
(underlining added)
The court next dealt with the issue of whether or
not a conveyance of the servient estate during the pre·
scriptive period, without mention of the user of the roadway, interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
The court, on page 717, cited numerous cases and author·
ities and concluded:
"The conveyance of the servient estate in anu
of itself during the prescriptive period does not
interrupt the running of that time. However
the change of ownership of the servient estatr
during the prescriptive period may become important in determining whether the servient el·
tate owner knew or should have known
the entire prescriptiveperiod that the claimant
was using the claimed right of way."
The court there found that the owner was on noticr
by the continued use by the plaintiff just as in our casr
where the subsequent purchasers of the land, the named
defendants, must be charged with notice that the plain·
tiff's water was flowing through the drainage ditcli
eroding their lands at the time they acquired their land 1
and for many years since.
There is no evidence of express or even implied con·
18

sent giren to respondent and the burden is entirely upon
appellants to show that permission was given. There was
no evidence presented at the trial to show permission was
ei·er given. On the other hand substantial and multiplicitous e''idence was presented which showed an original lack of permission and continuous adverse use which
use caused damage.

POINT II
THE TRIER OF THE FACTS 'VAS TlI1£
lX TIIE
COCRT. IF THERE IS
HECORD TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S DECISION, IT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
ON APPEAL.
The court, after listening to the testimony and ob:;erving the witnesses, found that the appellants ditch
was damaged from the use made by the respondent. l t
also found that the damage to the ditch commenced from
th very beginning of the use. It also concluded that the
respoHdents had met the requirements of obtaining a
right or easement by prescription.
This court in substance held in the matter of Newton vs. State Road Commission, 463 P2d, 565, 23 Utah
:!d 350, where there has been a full trial of the issues and
rourt has made findings and entered judgment thereon,
Sui1reme Court will review the evidence and reasonable
inf errences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in light
most fa ,·orable to the findings and judgment. See
19

mott vs. U. S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 356, 453 P2d 155·'
Smith vs. Gallogos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P2D 570.
CONCLUSION
The appellant having based his appeal on the theory
that the use made by respondents in appellants drainage
ditch was a use that did not interfere with the lando'llJn.
ers use or cause "him damage. The trier of the facts haY·
ing found other wise from the evidence presented, ap·
pellant must fail in his appeal. He cannot from the evidence make his case come within the exceptions set out
in the cases cited by him. Respondent sincerely requesb
this court to sustain the decision of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
Walter G. Mann, of
MANN & HADFIELD
35 First Security Bank Building
Brigham City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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